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The Effect of Expected Value on Attraction Effect Preference Reversals
GEORGE D. FARMER,1* PAUL A. WARREN,1 WAEL EL-DEREDY1,2 and ANDREW HOWES3
1Division of Neuroscience and Experimental Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
2School of Biomedical Engineering, University of Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile
3School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
The attraction effect shows that adding a third alternative to a choice set can alter preference between the original two options. For over 30 years,
this simple demonstration of context dependence has been taken as strong evidence against a class of parsimonious value-maximising models
that evaluate alternatives independently from one another. Signiﬁcantly, however, in previous demonstrations of the attraction effect alternatives
are approximately equally valuable, so there was little consequence to the decision maker irrespective of which alternative was selected. Here we
vary the difference in expected value between alternatives and provide the ﬁrst demonstration that, although extinguished with large differences,
this theoretically important effect persists when choice between alternatives has a consequence. We use this result to clarify the implications of
the attraction effect, arguing that although it robustly violates the assumptions of value-maximising models, it does not eliminate the possibility
that human decision making is optimal. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web-site.
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INTRODUCTION
The attraction effect (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982) refers to
the puzzling change in preference that occurs when an
apparently irrelevant alternative is added to a choice set. This
decoy option, despite not being chosen, nonetheless changes
preferences between existing members of the set. Over
30 years of research into the effect have shown it to be a ro-
bust phenomenon highlighting the impact of context on deci-
sion making. It has been found in choices among prospects
(Herne, 1999; Soltani, De Martino, & Camerer, 2012;
Wedell, 1991), low-level perceptual decisions (Choplin &
Hummel, 2005; Trueblood, Brown, Heathcote, &
Busemeyer, 2013), motor planning decisions (Farmer, El-
Deredy, Howes, & Warren, 2015), inference tasks
(Trueblood, 2012), choices between consumer products
(Huber et al., 1982; Noguchi & Stewart, 2014; Simonson &
Tversky, 1992), animal choice (Shaﬁr, Waite, & Smith,
2002), and even decisions made by slime mould (Latty &
Beekman, 2011). Despite the presence of the effect across
species and paradigms, recent work has cast doubt on the
robustness of the attraction effect in human consumer deci-
sion making (Frederick, Lee, & Baskin, 2014; Yang & Lynn,
2014). Frederick et al. (2014) argue that the effect may only
be elicited when choice problems are described in terms of a
numeric representation of their attribute values. Alternative
representations such as images of products or pie charts
representing gambles are shown not to elicit the effect.
In the standard form of the attraction effect, options in a
choice set are described by two attributes that trade-off, such
as the probability and value of prospects, or the fuel-
economy and acceleration of a car. Two of the options are
difﬁcult to choose between because each dominates the other
on one of the attributes. When a third decoy option is intro-
duced, it is dominated by one of the original options (the
target) on both attributes and by the other option (the
competitor) on only one attribute (Figure 1).
Adding this asymmetrically dominated decoy has the
effect of biasing choice away from the competitor toward
the target. In a two-option choice, each option might be cho-
sen 50% of the time, but when the decoy is added, the target
might be chosen 60% of the time, and the competitor 40% of
the time. Note that the decoy is not chosen as it is obviously
worse than the target. Despite this, its presence inﬂuences the
ratio of choices between target and competitor.
Perhaps the biggest inﬂuence of the effect on the decision-
making literature has been the observation that it violates the
axioms of regularity and independence from irrelevant alter-
natives, necessary in Luce’s (1959) choice axiom and other
value-maximising models (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Heath
& Chatterjee, 1991; Huber et al., 1982; Louie, Khaw, &
Glimcher, 2013; Ratneshwar, Shocker, & Stewart, 1987;
Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Sen, 1998; Simonson,
1989; Tsetsos, Usher, & Chater, 2010; Tversky & Simonson,
1993; Usher & McClelland, 2004). This failure of rational
models to account for the attraction effect has led to the inter-
pretation that it is sub-optimal: ‘people err by complicating
rather than simplifying the task’ (Tversky & Simonson,
1993, p. 1188); ‘A limitation of rationality in choice
preference’ (Usher, Elhalal, & McClelland, 2008, p. 297).
A number of theories of the choice process suggest that
sub-optimal behaviors arise because, rather than integrating
attribute values in an expected value like calculation, people
make ordinal comparisons between options. Only recently
have these proposed processes been examined with
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eye-tracking data (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014). These data
suggest that people compare pairs of alternatives within the
attended attribute, supporting accounts of context effects such
as decision by sampling (Stewart, 2009) and the multi-
attribute linear ballistic accumulator model (Trueblood,
Brown, & Heathcote, 2014). For example, in decision by
sampling, the attraction effect is theorised to result from the
comparison of pairs of alternatives within an attribute; as
the target-decoy comparison accumulates wins for the target
on both attributes, whereas the competitor decoy comparison
accumulates a win and a loss for the competitor, it is the target
that beneﬁts the most from the presence of the decoy.
Existing demonstrations of the attraction effect use deci-
sions between alternatives that are approximately equally
valuable. Indeed, many designs explicitly use target and
competitor prospects that have the same expected value
(Herne, 1999; Huber et al., 1982; Wedell, 1991), or that have
subjectively equivalent expected values (Soltani et al., 2012).
In perceptual decisions, Trueblood et al. (2013) found the
attraction effect when participants were asked to select the
rectangle with the largest area. The target and competitor
stimuli presented, in fact, had the same area. This feature of
these designs is intended to provide the most favourable
environment for eliciting the attraction effect. Having the
same expected value makes the options hard to choose
between, so preferences may be less certain and more easily
biased by the decoy. Indeed, there is some evidence for this
as Mishra, Umesh, and Stem (1993) show that initial prefer-
ence levels can predict the extent of the attraction effect.
In this paper, we argue that existing demonstrations of the
attraction effect provide evidence that people violate the
axioms of value-maximising models, but not that they are
sub-optimal. Because these experiments typically use alter-
natives that are of approximately equal expected value to
elicit the effect, participants will maximise utility in these
experiments regardless of whether they choose the target or
competitor. As long as they avoid a dominated decoy, all
of their choices are, by virtue of the experimental design,
utility-maximising. The attraction effect, therefore, reveals a
decision process that violates axioms required of value
maximisation but fails to provide evidence that this occurs
in situations where there is a material consequence. In the
studies reported subsequently, we have addressed this issue
by parametrically manipulating the expected value difference
(EVD) between the two non-decoy alternatives. The aim of
the experiments is to demonstrate, for the ﬁrst time, that
preference reversals can cause participants to make non-
utility-maximising choices.1
Many rational theories of choice are ‘as if’ models, silent
on the mechanism that reaches the decision, concerned
instead with the consequences of the decision. If the attrac-
tion effect can be elicited in the face of EVDs, then we can
start to ascertain how important it is in terms of outcome,
rather than what it tells us about choice mechanisms. This
point is of critical importance to economists and proponents
of rational value-maximising accounts.
[we should] conduct experiments which show not merely that
individuals are sometimes systematically non-rational, but
which would start to give us some feeling for how important this
phenomenon might be. For example, I don’t think that any of the
preference reversal experiments have yet given information that
would allow us to graph the frequency of preference reversals as
a function of the difference in expected value (in, say, percent-
age terms) between the two gambles with which subjects are pre-
sented. While this information might not dramatically affect how
investigators with very different theoretical dispositions
evaluated the data, it would help address the issue of whether
we are seeing a phenomenon likely to play an important role
in natural environments (Roth, 1996, p. 202).
In what follows, we provide a rigorous test of the impor-
tance and robustness of the attraction effect using both
explicitly described, and more perceptual representations of
gambles. We discuss the implications of these results for
theories of human choice. In particular, we argue that while
contextual preference reversals appear locally irrational in
the sense of violating axioms of decision models, they may
in fact be globally rational when the decision environment
and cognitive constraints are taken into account (Howes,
Warren, Farmer, El-Deredy, & Lewis, 2016).
Overview of experiments
In Experiment 1, we devised a perceptual representation of
lotteries and manipulated the absolute difference in expected
value between target and competitor prospects. Participants
made time-limited choices and could only view one prospect
at a time. In Experiment 2, we sought to replicate and
generalise Experiment 1 to demonstrate that the effects
observed were not task dependent. We used a relative (per-
centage) difference in expected value between the prospects
and removed the time and serial viewing constraints. We
further extended the design to include additional stimuli
1We manipulate the expected value difference between lotteries as a proxy
for expected utility.
Figure 1. The attraction effect in choices among prospects. The
decoy is dominated by the target on both attributes, but by the com-
petitor on only one. In this ﬁgure, A is the target and B is the
competitor. If the decoy were in the solid area rather than the dashed
area, then B would be the target and A the competitor
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types including explicitly described gambles and an area
judgment task based on Trueblood et al. (2013).
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
Forty-seven students and staff (14 male) from the University
of Manchester volunteered to take part. Participants were
between 21 and 53 years old (M=27). Informed consent
was collected, and participants were paid £7.00. The
experiment took approximately 45minutes to complete.
Design
We used a within-subjects design to test the effect of EVD on
the dependent variable of preference reversal rate. For each
participant, preference reversal was measured as the propor-
tion of target choices minus the proportion of competitor
choices.
The EVD independent variable had four levels (0, 3, 6,
and 9). In order to achieve four levels of EVD, eight pros-
pects were chosen. Four (called the V prospects) were given
a ﬁxed probability of .2 and varying values to achieve
expected values 8, 11, 14, and 17. The other four prospects
(the P prospects) were given a ﬁxed value of 25 and varying
probabilities to achieve the same expected values as the V
prospects (Table 1). Each V prospect had a higher value,
but lower probability than each P prospect. Each of the V
prospects was paired with each of the P prospects to create
16 choice sets. Prospect pairs with the same expected value
had an EVD of zero, while, for instance, a prospect with
expected value eight paired with a prospect with expected
value 17 had an EVD of nine.
Each of the choice sets was presented once with prospect
P as the target and once with prospect V as the target
resulting in 32 unique choice sets. Each of these unique
choice sets was repeated eight times, creating a total of 256
trials per participant. The experiment was divided into four
blocks of 64 trials. The presentation of the trials was
completely randomised with the exception that two trials
could not be consecutive if the only difference between them
was the position of the decoy. This control was added to
ensure that the experimental manipulation was not too
obvious to the participants. The decoy position deﬁned
whether prospect V or prospect P was the target. The decoys
were always of the same value as their target but with 10%
lower probability.
Stimuli
Participants were asked to choose between three prospects.
Each prospect had a probability p of winning a value v in
the form p(v) or (1 p)(0). The probability of each prospect
was presented to participants using a grid consisting of 100
squares (Figure 2). For a prospect with a success probability
of .6, 60 of the squares were shaded green. For a success
probability of .4, 40 of the squares were shaded green, and
so on. The position of the green squares within the grid
was randomised. The value of each prospect was presented
in an identical 10 by 10 grid immediately below the
probability information. For the value grid, the display was
not randomised and was shaded red. Forty red squares
indicated a value of 40, 70 red squares a value of 70, and
so on. There were six grids in total, one probability and
one value grid for each of the three prospects.
Procedure
At the start of each trial, all of the displays were blank.
Participants revealed the probability and value information
for each prospect by holding the mouse button down in a
blue shaded area between the probability and value displays.
Lifting off the mouse button cleared the display. Participants
could only view one prospect at a time but could choose any
order to view them. This prevented participants from
assessing alternative prospects by making a perceptual com-
parison of the visual density of the different displays,
encouraging them instead to encode the information. In each
trial, participants were given 5 seconds of viewing time that
they could distribute between each of the prospects as they
Table 1. Expected value difference between prospect pairs in
Experiment 1
High
probability
prospects
(P)
Low probability prospects (V)
.2 (40) .2 (55) .2 (70) .2 (85)
.68 (25) 9 6 3 0
.56 (25) 6 3 0 3
.44 (25) 3 0 3 6
.32 (25) 0 3 6 9
Figure 2. The stimuli used in Experiment 1. The density of green
squares (top row) represents the probability of the prospect. The
number of red squares (bottom row) represents the value of the
prospect. Each column represents an alternative prospect. The prob-
ability and value of only a single prospect are displayed at any one
time. The participant chooses a prospect by pressing the
corresponding ‘select’ button
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saw ﬁt. A 5-second countdown timer was displayed on the
left of the interface. The timer only counted down while the
participants had the mouse button depressed, and the proba-
bility and value information were visible. Participants could
only make their choice once the timer had reached zero. An
enforced assessment duration allowed us to control the
amount of effort participants put into each trial. Participants
were asked to choose the prospect they preferred by clicking
a button marked ‘Select’ that was positioned below the value
grid for each of the prospects. Participants did not receive
any feedback on their decisions.
Analysis
As noted, in order to determine the preference reversal rate,
we subtracted the proportion of competitor choices from
the proportion of target choices. This metric was averaged
across the prospect pairs for each level of EVD. A positive
difference indicated that participants preferred a prospect
more often when it was the target than when it was the com-
petitor; this is the outcome that is expected when measuring
the attraction effect. A negative difference indicated that
participants preferred a prospect more often when it was
the competitor than when it was the target. No difference
indicated that participants were consistent and chose a pros-
pect the same number of times regardless of whether it was
the target or competitor.
Results
To check that participants perceived the decoy option as infe-
rior to the target option, we examined decoy selections for
each of the 16 choice sets in both contexts. Participants
sometimes chose the decoy option instead of the target or
competitor. Five participants were excluded from all
analyses as their decoy selection rate exceeded 2.5 times
the median absolute deviation (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard,
& Licata, 2013).
Effect of expected value difference
Figure 3 shows that the preference reversal rate decreased as
EVD increased. An EVD of zero yielded the highest prefer-
ence reversal rate and was signiﬁcantly different from zero
assessed with a two-tailed one-sample t test, t(41) = 3.16,
p< .01, d= .50. The preference reversal rate at an EVD of
three was also signiﬁcant, t(41) = 2.91, p= .01, d= .45.2
EVDs of six and nine yielded preference reversal rates not
signiﬁcantly different from zero (t(41) = 1.39, p= .172,
d= .21 and t(41) = 1.34, p= .264, d= .17 respectively). A
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed
a signiﬁcant effect of EVD on preference reversal rate,
F(3, 123) = 3.19, p= .026, η2 = .07.
Discussion
The results show that, while increasing the difference in
expected value between target and competitor prospects
reduces the effect of having an asymmetrically dominated
decoy in the choice set, the attraction effect is still observed
when the EVD is 3 points. In other words, participants can
switch to options with lower expected values because of a
decoy. The decoy was not able, on average, to persuade
participants to switch preference when larger differences in
expected value were involved.
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
We designed Experiment 2 to be a replication of Experiment
1 using a relative, rather than absolute measure of EVD. We
also sought to test the generality of our ﬁndings by using a
range of different stimuli types. While Experiment 1 shows
that participants were sensitive to increases in absolute
EVD, it is important to note that an EVD of £3 may be per-
ceived as much larger when going from £3 to £6 than when
going from £100 to £103. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we
used the percentage increase in expected value from the
smaller to the larger prospect as our independent variable.
This allowed us to test how robust our ﬁndings were and
whether they extend to other paradigms that have been used
to elicit the attraction effect. See Stimuli section for more
details. In Experiment 2, there was no time limit and partici-
pants could view all three prospects simultaneously.
Participants
One hundred and forty-three undergraduate psychology
students from the University of Manchester volunteered to
take part, 50 in Experiment 2a, 52 in Experiment 2b, and
41 in Experiment 2c. Participants received course credits
for participating.
Figure 3. Experiment 1 results. Preference reversal rate for each
level of absolute difference in expected value. Error bars are 95%
conﬁdence intervals. Asterisks denote that the preference reversal
rate was signiﬁcantly greater than zero
2Contingent on the exclusion of participants with high rates of decoy
selections.
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Design
In each trial, participants chose between a target, competitor,
and decoy prospect. Our independent variable was the
difference in expected value between the target and
competitor prospects. EVD had four levels—0%, 20%,
100%, and 300%—reﬂecting the percentage increase in
expected value from the smaller to larger expected value
prospect. Sixteen prospect pairs (Table 2) were created
spanning probability and value space, four for each of the
independent variable levels.
Each prospect pair was presented to the participants eight
times with one prospect as target, and eight times with the
other prospect as target. The decoys had either 20% fewer
value points or 20% fewer probability points than the target.
The experiment consisted of 256 trials (4 independent
variable levels × 4 prospect pairs × 2 decoy positions × 8
repetitions), which were presented in random order. The
preference reversal rate (the dependent variable) was
calculated in the same way as in Experiment 1. See the
Experiment 1 Analysis section for details.
Stimuli
Experiment 2a was very similar to Experiment 1, conveying
the probabilities and values via the same grid display. The
stimuli differed in that the probability grid was not
randomised (the green squares appeared as one continuous
block).
Experiment 2b presented the stimuli in a manner more
similar to the original Wedell (Wedell, 1991) design;
sentences were displayed on-screen to convey the objective
probabilities and values of each prospect (top panel of
Figure 4). Prospects were presented simultaneously in
sentence form ‘p probability of v points’.
In Experiment 2c, we modelled our stimuli on those used
by Trueblood et al. (2013) using a rectangle area instead of
expected value (bottom panel of Figure 4). Participants were
presented with three rectangles and asked to choose the rect-
angle with the largest area. The height and width of the rect-
angles in pixels were the same as probabilities and values
used for the prospects in 2a and 2b. As both the area of a rect-
angle and expected value of our prospects are given by the
product of their attributes, it was simple to substitute EVD
for area difference.
Procedure
For all three experiments, participants were presented with
three prospects or rectangles simultaneously on a computer
monitor. Below each option, a button marked ‘select’
allowed participants to indicate which prospect they
preferred or rectangle they perceived to have the largest area.
The on-screen order of the three stimuli in each trial was
randomised; 256 trials were presented in four blocks of 64
trials with an enforced 1-minute break between blocks.
Results
Experiment 2a
As in Experiment 1, we removed participants whose decoy
selection rate exceeded 2.5 times the median absolute devia-
tion (Leys et al., 2013). Seven participants were removed
from the following analysis.
The preference reversal rate was similar in the 0% EVD
and 20% EVD conditions but fell in the 100% and 300%
EVD conditions. See Figure 5 (left panel). A repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant effect of EVD on
preference reversal rate, F(3, 126) = 4.99, p< .01, η2 = .11.
Preference reversal rates were signiﬁcant under a two-tailed,
one-sample t test at zero EVD (t(42) = 3.91, p< .01, d= .60),
20% EVD (t(42) = 4.33, p< .01, d= .66), 100% EVD (t(42)
= 3.10, p< .01, d= .47), and 300% EVD (t(42) = 2.61,
p= .01, d= .40).3
Experiment 2b
Ten participants whose decoy selection rate exceeded 2.5
times the median absolute deviation were removed from the
analysis.
The preference reversal rate fell steadily from the 0%
EVD condition to close to zero in the 300% EVD condition.
See Figure 5 (middle panel). A repeated-measures ANOVA
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of EVD on preference reversal
rate, F(3, 123) = 12.24, p< .01, η2 = .23. Preference reversal
rates were signiﬁcant under a two-tailed, one-sample t test
at zero EVD (t(41) = 4.90, p< .01, d= .91), 20% EVD
(t(41) = 3.09, p< .01, d= .48), and 100% EVD (t(41) = 2.58,
p= .01, d= .40). At 300% EVD, the preference reversal rate
was not signiﬁcant (t(41) =.434, p= .667, d= .07).4
Figure 6 shows the distribution of preference reversal
rates. The positive bias in the histograms indicates the pres-
ence of the attraction effect, whereas a zero mean would
indicate no effect of the decoy. The distributions for the other
experiments were similarly shaped (Supporting Information).
Experiment 2c
Two participants whose decoy selection rate exceeded 2.5
times the median absolute deviation were removed from the
analysis.
The preference reversal rate was low, around 5% in the
zero and 20% EVD conditions, falling to around zero in the
100% and 300% area difference conditions. See Figure 5
Table 2. Stimuli values used in Experiment 2
Reference
prospect
Alternative prospect
Δ0% Δ20% Δ100% Δ300%
.12 (83) .24 (42) .29 (42) .48 (42) .96 (42)
.17 (59) .24 (42) .29 (42) .48 (42) .96 (42)
.59 (17) .42 (24) .42 (29) .42 (48) .42 (96)
.83 (12) .42 (24) .42 (29) .42 (48) .42 (96)
3The signiﬁcance of the one-sample t tests at 100% and 300% EVD are con-
tingent on the exclusion of participants who had high decoy selection rates.
4The signiﬁcance of the one-sample t test at 100% EVD is contingent on the
exclusion of participants who had high decoy selection rates.
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(right panel). A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a sig-
niﬁcant effect of area difference on preference reversal rate,
F(3, 114) = 4.91, p< .01, η2 = .12. The preference reversal
rate was not signiﬁcant under a two-tailed, one-sample t test
at zero area difference (t(38) = 1.48, p= .148, d= .24) but was
at 20% area difference (t(38) = 2.54, p= .02, d= .41).
Preference reversals were not signiﬁcant at 100% area differ-
ence (t(38) =1.29, p= .204, d= .21). The preference
reversal rate was in the opposite direction to the attraction ef-
fect and signiﬁcant at 300% area difference (t(38) =5.28,
p< .01, d= .84); owing to the very small number of inconsis-
tent choices at this level of area difference, the t statistic is
disproportionately affected by the few inconsistent and
decoy choices. Across all participants, 2496 choices were
made in this condition, and 98.6% of those choices correctly
identiﬁed the rectangle with the larger area. Of the 35 incor-
rect choices, 31 were decoy choices made when the target
alternative was the correct option. We interpret these choices
as inattention because the decoy was strictly dominated by
the target. Nonetheless, with such a large difference in area
between target and competitor, the presence of a decoy
alternative does harm the choice share of the target (when
the target is the correct alternative).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of both experiments provide the ﬁrst evidence
that the attraction effect can cause people to make choices
that do not maximise expected value. While previous
experiments have revealed the attraction effect in choice sets
that had the same expected value, we have shown that the
effect is exhibited when one choice has a higher expected
value than the other. Our results also indicate that as the
difference in expected value increases, so the attraction effect
declines. Given a sufﬁcient difference in expected value,
people will not exhibit the attraction effect. In Experiment
1, the preference reversal rate was not signiﬁcantly different
from zero for the two larger differences in expected value.
Likewise in Experiment 2, preference reversal rates fell as
the difference in expected value increased.
Differences in the rate of preference reversal between
Experiments 1 and 2a, which used similar stimuli, are likely
due to the lack of time pressure in Experiment 2. Time
pressure in attraction effect experiments has been shown to
reduce the size of the effect (Pettibone, 2012). It should be
noted that we use EVDs as a proxy for expected utility
differences, and a useful replication would be to test these
Figure 4. Stimuli used in Experiment 2. The top panel shows the descriptive stimuli from Experiment 2b, while the bottom panel shows the
rectangle stimuli in Experiment 2c
Figure 5. Preference reversal rate for each level of expected value difference in Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. Aster-
isks denote reversal rates signiﬁcantly different from zero
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results using a direct expected utility manipulation. It is also
apparent that the results of Experiment 2c reveal a smaller
preference reversal rate than the other paradigms. The size
of the change is however consistent with that reported in pre-
vious work using area judgments (Trueblood et al., 2013).
Our results from Experiment 2c, together with those from
Trueblood et al. (2013), do suggest that the attraction effect
can impact upon perceptual judgments. These data are in
contrast to those reported by Frederick et al. (2014) who
failed to ﬁnd an effect in a rectangle area judgment task.
However, more recent studies have replicated the effect
using similar stimuli in rhesus macaques (Parrish, Evans, &
Beran, 2015) and in children (Zhen & Yu, 2016). Frederick
et al. also argue that the attraction effect may not be elicited
in gambles when these are represented perceptually rather
than explicitly. We have found an attraction effect in
gambles represented both explicitly and perceptually. Using
very similar designs, in both representations, we found that
differences in expected value decrease the attraction effect,
and also that the effect can persist when differences are
present. Overall, our data suggest that the attraction effect
is in fact a robust phenomenon.
This ﬁnding poses a more severe problem for rational the-
ories of choice than previous preference reversal studies, as it
shows not just the violation of an axiom but also the potential
for a lower value outcome as a result of the behavior. This
second point should be much more important for rational the-
orists than the axiomatic violation. That the attraction effect
occurs in the face of EVDs addresses concerns that have
been expressed over a number of years in the literature
(Anderson, 1990; Hahn & Harris, 2014; Roth, 1996). Roth,
as quoted in the Introduction to the current article, is
concerned less with the existence of preference reversals
and more with quantifying how important they might be,
with importance being a function of their robustness in the
presence of differences in expected value. Similarly, Hahn
and Harris (2014) have critiqued logical demonstrations of
irrationality in human decision making for often failing to
examine the cost of these phenomena. This emphasis on
the cost of such behaviors is theoretically important because
proponents of rational accounts are more concerned with the
quality of the outcome than the process that produces the
decision. Anderson makes the following point with respect
to violations of transitivity in his introduction to rational
analysis:
A question that is rarely asked is whether there is really a cost
associated with the purported irrationality. If a person prefers
A to B, B to C and C to A, but there are no differences among
A, B, and C in their adaptive value, then the intransitivity does
not violate the adaptive principle of rationality (Anderson,
1990, p. 32).
Our results suggest that the attraction effect might
properly be considered in violation of value-maximising
models because it can lead people to choose, within some
tolerance, the lower expected value of two alternatives. One
interpretation might be that this reveals how our bounded
decision processes prevent us from achieving normative
standards in decision making. Certainly, data showing ordi-
nal comparisons, as observed by Noguchi and Stewart
(2014), suggest that people are engaged in a process other
than expected value calculation (although these data do not
yet tell us what happens across the full range of EVDs).
Existing accounts of the attraction effect often state that it
Figure 6. Histograms of preference reversal rate for Experiment 2b. The vertical dashed line at zero represents the expected mean of the dis-
tribution if participants were consistent in their choices. Distributions with a positive mean indicate the presence of the attraction effect. See
Supporting Information for histograms of Experiments 1, 2a, and 2c
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is problematic for value-maximising theories because it
violates the key axioms of regularity and independence from
irrelevant alternatives. In these accounts, the behavior is
interpreted as a side effect of larger decision-making systems
or heuristics, and not as a behavior that is beneﬁcial.
In contrast, an alternative explanation is that preference
reversals are rational (Bordley, 1992; Howes et al., 2016;
McNamara, Trimmer, & Houston, 2014; Shenoy, & Yu,
2013; Trimmer, 2013). Rather than taking axiomatic
violations as evidence that people’s cognitive bounds prevent
them from achieving normatively correct decisions, we can
assume the cognitive bounds and ask what the optimal deci-
sion should be given those limitations (Howes, Lewis, &
Vera, 2009; Lewis, Howes, & Singh, 2014). In another
recent work, we apply this approach to show that assuming
the constraint of noisy expected value calculation is sufﬁcient
to make the attraction effect beneﬁcial (Howes et al., 2016).
This is because the presence of the decoy provides informa-
tion about the likely values of the other alternatives where all
the alternatives are regarded as samples from a common
environment. Consider the situation where three prospects
are available but nothing is known about their attribute
values. In this scenario, each option is equally likely to have
the highest expected value. However, if we know the ordinal
relations between the attribute values (but not their cardinal
values), we can determine which option is most likely to
have the highest expected value. In the case of the attraction
effect, the ordinal relations that deﬁne the alternatives are
p(T)> p(D)>p(C) and v(C)> v(T)> v(D), where p(X)
indicates the probability of success for lottery X and v(X)
indicates the value of a win for lottery X. Given this informa-
tion, there are three possible expected value relations in
which T dominates D on both attributes: EV(T)>EV(D)>
EV(C), EV(T)>EV(C)>EV(D), and EV(C)>EV(T)>
EV(D). In two of these, the target has higher expected value
than the competitor. There is therefore a two-thirds probabil-
ity that the target is a better choice than the competitor given
just the ordinal information. The only requirement for this in-
formation to be useful is that the decision maker does not
have a noise-free estimate of expected value—a requirement
that seems incontrovertible. Using only this assumption of
noisy perception, Howes et al. (2016) show that it is rational
to update the expected value estimate with the information
provided by the ordinal relations. This process naturally pro-
duces the attraction effect, as well as other contextual prefer-
ence reversals including the similarity and compromise
effects. It should also be noted that this explanation is consis-
tent with the attraction effect declining as EVD increases.
This is because a large difference in expected value will re-
solve the ambiguity caused by noisy estimation and reduce
the impact of considering the ordinal relations. More
broadly, in a particular choice instance, a person may appear
locally irrational by virtue of choice axiom violations, but
when the global context and relevant priors or cognitive con-
straints are taken into account, the behavior may be rational.
By examining the attraction effect in an environment in
which it is possible to not value-maximise, we have
established a relationship between the effect and value
maximisation (as recommended by Anderson, 1990; Hahn
& Harris, 2014; Roth, 1996). Rather than take phenomena
such as the attraction effect as evidence that rational value-
maximising accounts do not explain human decision making,
a more fruitful approach would be to consider why a behavior
occurs as well as how it occurs. Attempting to answer the why
question is the objective in value-maximising accounts. This
type of explanation also has the beneﬁt of providing a con-
straint on the number of plausible processes (as only a small
subset may be optimal) that can produce a behavior. It is im-
portant therefore that apparently irrational phenomena are not
seen as validating process accounts over rational accounts. In-
stead, these phenomena might be better understood by
allowing process and rational accounts to complement one
another in furthering our understanding of decision making.
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